Practical Attacks on the Maelstrom-0 Compression Function

Jun 1, 2011·
Stefan Kölbl
Stefan Kölbl
,
Florian Mendel
· 0 min read
Abstract
In this paper we present attacks on the compression function of Maelstrom-0. It is based on the Whirlpool hash function standardized by ISO and was designed to be a faster and more robust enhancement. We analyze the compression function and use differential cryptanalysis to construct collisions for reduced variants of the Maelstrom-0 compression function. The attacks presented in this paper are of practical complexity and show significant weaknesses in the construction compared to its predecessor. The methods used are based on recent results in the analysis of AES-based hash functions.
Type
Publication
publications
Stefan Kölbl
Authors
Staff Engineer, Tech Lead Manager

I am a Staff Engineer and Tech Lead Manager at Google, where I work in the Security Engineering team. My focus is on post-quantum cryptography and enabling developers at Google and across the internet to use cryptography safely and correctly.

I have a PhD in cryptography and an extensive background in the design and analysis of symmetric-key algorithms, post-quantum cryptography, and lightweight cryptography. I have contributed to several cryptographic standardization efforts, including the SKINNY cipher, which is part of the ISO/IEC 29192-2 standard. I also contributed to the SPHINCS+ signature scheme, which was standardized by NIST as FIPS 205. I currently represent Switzerland in the ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27/WG 2 committee for cryptography and security mechanisms.

Before joining Google, I was a Senior Technology Manager at Cybercrypt and a postdoctoral researcher at the Technical University of Denmark, working on the H2020 PQCRYPTO project.