Practical Attacks on AES-like Cryptographic Hash Functions

Jun 1, 2014·
Stefan Kölbl
Stefan Kölbl
,
Christian Rechberger
· 0 min read
Abstract
Despite the great interest in rebound attacks on AES-like hash functions since 2009, we report on a rather generic, albeit keyschedule-dependent, algorithmic improvement: A new message modification technique to extend the inbound phase, which even for large internal states makes it possible to drastically reduce the complexity of attacks to very practical values for reduced-round versions. Furthermore, we describe new and practical attacks on Whirlpool and the recently proposed GOST R hash function with one or more of the following properties: more rounds, less time/memory complexity, and more relevant model. To allow for easy verification, we also provide a source-code for them.
Type
Publication
publications
Stefan Kölbl
Authors
Staff Engineer, Tech Lead Manager

I am a Staff Engineer and Tech Lead Manager at Google, where I work in the Security Engineering team. My focus is on post-quantum cryptography and enabling developers at Google and across the internet to use cryptography safely and correctly.

I have a PhD in cryptography and an extensive background in the design and analysis of symmetric-key algorithms, post-quantum cryptography, and lightweight cryptography. I have contributed to several cryptographic standardization efforts, including the SKINNY cipher, which is part of the ISO/IEC 29192-2 standard. I also contributed to the SPHINCS+ signature scheme, which was standardized by NIST as FIPS 205. I currently represent Switzerland in the ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27/WG 2 committee for cryptography and security mechanisms.

Before joining Google, I was a Senior Technology Manager at Cybercrypt and a postdoctoral researcher at the Technical University of Denmark, working on the H2020 PQCRYPTO project.